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Abstract—EMV, also known as “Chip and PIN”, is the
leading system for smartcard-based payments worldwide; it
is widely deployed in Europe and is starting to be introduced
in the USA too. It replaces the familiar mag-strip cards with
chip cards. A cryptographic protocol is executed between a
chip card and bank servers based on a message authentication
code (MAC) over transaction data, including a nonce called
the unpredictable number.
We discovered two protocol flaws: first, the lack of a
terminal ID to identify involved parties, and second that the
nonce is not generated by the relying party. Together, these
make EMV vulnerable to the pre-play attack: pre-recorded
transaction data from a target card can be replayed at a future
location. This powerful attack can be exploited due to weak
random number generators, by a man-in-the-middle between
the terminal and the acquirer, or by malware in an ATM or
POS terminal.
Our investigation started when we discovered that EMV
implementers often used counters, timestamps or home-grown
algorithms to supply the nonce. We describe the survey
methodology we developed to chart the scope of this weakness,
evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field,
and our proof-of-concept attack implementation. Finally, we
explore why these flaws evaded detection until now.
I. THE SMOKING GUN
EMV is the leading scheme worldwide for card payments
and cash withdrawals at ATMs. More than 1.62 billion cards
are in use worldwide, and EMV is now being adopted in the
USA. EMV cards contain a smartcard chip, and are more
difficult to clone than the traditional magnetic-strip cards.
Yet in the decade since its introduction, a whole series of
significant vulnerabilities have emerged.
The case that kicked off the research we report here was
when Mr Gambin, a Maltese customer of HSBC, complained
about a series of ATM transactions that were wrongly billed
to his card in Palma, Majorca on the 29th June 2011, after he
bought a meal at a restaurant there. He was refused a refund
and asked us for advice. We observed that one of the fields
in the log file, the “unpredictable number”, looked rather
predictable, as shown in Figure 1. It appears to consist of a
17 bit fixed value followed by a 15-bit counter that cycles
every three monutes.
If the “unpredictable number” generated by an ATM is
in fact predictable, then a criminal with temporary access
to a card (say, in a Mafia-owned shop) can precompute
Date Time UN
2011-06-29 10:37:24 F1246E04
2011-06-29 10:37:59 F1241354
2011-06-29 10:38:34 F1244328
2011-06-29 10:39:08 F1247348
Figure 1. Consecutive unpredictable numbers from an ATM
the authentication codes needed to draw cash from that
ATM at some time in the future. We call this the “pre-
play” attack. We discovered that many ATMs generate poor
random numbers; what’s worse, a flaw in the protocol can let
an attacker substitute a precomputed transaction even where
the random number generator is sound.
We informed the industry in early 2012 so that ATM
software could be patched. We are now publishing the details
to provide customers the evidence to pursue wrongly-denied
claims, and to enable the crypto, security and bank regulation
communities to learn the lessons.
II. BACKGROUND
In EMV, each bank card contains a smartcard chip, which
authenticates transaction data using a message authentication
code (MAC) calculated with a symmetric key shared be-
tween the card and the card-issuing bank. The chip protects
against card counterfeiting. ButEMV did not cut fraud as
much as hoped, as can be seen in Figure 2. Criminals
adapted in several ways. First, they moved from card cloning
to “card-not-present” transactions – Internet, mail-order, and
phone-based payments.
Second, they started making magnetic-strip clones of
EMV cards. Instead of entering PINs only at ATMs, cus-
tomers were now entering their PIN in POS terminals, which
are much easier to tamper with [1]. Thieves steal card data
and PINs, then use mag-strip clones in countries like the
USA where ATMs still accept mag-strip cards.
Third, a number of technical vulnerabilities emerged.
For example, a stolen EMV card can be used in a POS
device without knowing the PIN; a crook can use a man-
in-the-middle device to trick the terminal into believing
that the right PIN was entered, while the card thinks it is
authorising a chip-and-signature transaction [2]. Criminals
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Figure 2. Fraud on UK payments cards (Fincial Fraud Auction UK 2014)
have now gone on trial in France for exploiting this “no-
PIN” vulnerability [3].
But a lot of fraud is still unexplained, and is often blamed
on the cardholder. So there is a public interest in discovering
new vulnerabilities, and the preplay attack discovered here
explains several fraud cases reported to us by cardholders in
Spain, Poland and the Baltic states.
III. THE PRE-PLAY ATTACK
An EMV transaction consists of three phases, as illus-
trated in Figure 3:
1) card authentication in which card details are read
and authenticated by the ATM or POS terminal;
2) cardholder verification in which the person who
presents the card is verified whether by PIN or sig-
nature; and
3) transaction authorization in which the issuing bank
decides whether the transaction should proceed.
The principals are the card, the ATM/POS device and
the issuer. It is the third phase that is of interest for the
pre-play attack. In transaction authentication, the ATM or
PIN entry device (PED) sends the card the amount, the
currency, the date, the terminal verification results (TVR –
the results of various checks performed by the ATM), and
a nonce (in EMV terminology, the “unpredictable number”
or UN). The card responds with a MAC known as the
authorization request cryptogram (ARQC), calculated over
these records, over the application transaction counter (ATC
– a 16 bit number stored by the card and incremented on
each transaction) and the issuer application data (IAD – a
proprietary data field to carry information from the card to
its issuer).
The ARQC is sent to the issuer, which verifies it, checks
whether funds are available, that the card has not been
reported stolen, and that the transaction does not look
suspicious. It then returns to the ATM an authorization
response code (ARC) and an authorization response cryp-
togram (ARPC). The card verifies the ARPC (which is
typically a MAC over the ARQC exclusive-or’ed with the
ARC), and returns an authenticated settlement record known
as a transaction certificate (TC), which may be sent to the
issuer immediately, or some time later as part of a settlement
process. All these MACs are computed using a key shared
between the card and the issuing bank, so the ATM or POS
terminal cannot verify them.
In a normal EMV transaction the card sends an ARQC to
prove that it is alive, present, and engaged in the transaction.
The ATM or POS device relies on the issuer to verify
this and authorise the transaction. The unpredictable number
ensures that transactions are unique, and tied to a specific
terminal. But If an attacker can predict it, then he can mount
a “pre-play” attack which is indistinguishable from card
cloning: authentication data are collected at one terminal
at moment in time, and played to one or more possible
verifying parties later. For example, a tampered terminal in
a store can collect card details and ARQCs from a victim
for use later, at an ATM or POS whose UN can be predicted
or manipulated. We now describe the two protocol flaws in
detail.
A. EMV protocol flaws
The first flaw is the specification, which does not require
the identity of the terminal – a classic mistake, reminiscent
of [4]. While the EMV framework can support a terminal
ID through a list of fields to be MACed in the ARQC (the
CDOL1), the standard format developed by Visa (the version
10 cryptogram format) requires only the terminal country
code.
The second flaw is in the protocol architecture: while
the terminal generates the random number, it is the issuing
bank that relies on it. Therefore, the issuer depends on the
merchant for transaction freshness, but the merchant may not
have the incentive to provide it, may not be able to deliver
it correctly due to lack of end-to-end authentication. In fact,
the terminal might even be collusive.
Recently there has been some formal analysis of EMV,
but this flaw was not discovered [5]. The model made two
errors. First, the UN was modelled as a fresh nonce, even
though this is not required by EMV. Second, the issuer and
terminal are modelled as the same principal, whereas they
are not; the terminal communicates with an acquirer (the
merchant’s bank) that in turn sends the transactions to a
switch that finally relays the transactions to the issuer.
B. Pre-play attacks based on a weak RNG
The EMV protocol designers did not think carefully about
what is required for the UN to be “unpredictable”. The
specifications and conformance testing procedures simply
required that four consecutive transactions performed by the
terminal should have unique unpredictable numbers [6, test
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Figure 3. Outline of an EMV transaction at ATM. Note that while the messages between card and ATM have been verified, messages between issuer
and ATM may vary depending on card scheme rules
2CM.085.00]. Thus a rational implementer in a hurry would
simply use a counter.
Since we disclosed this flaw, the EMV 4.2 specification
now offers guidance as to how to generate the unpredictable
number but previous versions left the algorithm entirely up
to implementers. Even the suggested construction (hash or
exclusive-or of previous ARQCs, transaction counter and
time) would not be adequate if the ATM is rebooted and
both the time and transaction counter are predictable.
1) UN data collection: Markettos and Moore [7] first
showed that a pre-play attack was possible against EMV
if the attacker could sabotage the RNG. However, before
our work, there was no empiral work on the quality of the
RNGs used by actual ATMs or POS terminals. So we set
out to collect UNs generated by ATMs and POS terminals
in our area, which together with log files from legal cases
give us an initial view of the EMV system in practice.
In order to obtain UN data and high-resolution timestamps
from ATMs, we made a set of passive monitoring cards by
adding our own ATM protocol analyser circuitry, consisting
of an additional microcontroller and memory, to a standard
debit card. This process required careful placement and
connection of very small components (down to 0.4 mm pin
pitch) and custom hardware to retrieve the transaction logs.
The modified card is shown in Figure 4. It remains a valid
payment card – the transaction flow proceeds as normal –
so it should always be accepted. It can also be inserted
into a variety of ATMs and POS devices without arousing
suspicion1.
For each ATM investigated, we harvested between five
and fifty unpredictable numbers by performing repeated
balance enquiries2 and then finally a small cash withdrawal.
We used balance enquiries to minimise the number of with-
drawals and avoid triggering any fraud monitoring systems.
At POS terminals, sales assistants are often briefed to
avoid handling or even looking at customer cards. So we
could use existing monitoring tools such as the Smart Card
Detective [8], which relies on a hidden wire running up the
experimenter’s sleeve.
During our UN collection campaign, we performed more
than 1,000 transactions across 22 different ATMs and five
POS terminals. Table I(a) shows a selection of data collected
from various ATMs exhibiting some ineffective algorithms.
ATM1 and ATM2 contain a typical pattern, which we denote
characteristic C, where the high bit and the third nibble
of each UN are always set to zero. This alone reduces
the entropy of the unpredictable numbers from 32 to 27
bits. 11 of 22 ATMs we looked at exhibited this. These
included ATMs of wildly different ages and running different
operating systems, so we suspect it to be an artifact of a
particular EMV kernel post-processing rather than of the
RNG source itself.
In Table I(b) we show a list of stronger consecutive
unpredictable numbers retrieved from a local POS terminal.
Even in this case the first bit appears to remain 0, which
1For ethical and prudential reasons we informed the police that such
experiments were underway; we also went through our local ethics process.
2It seems all transactions at ATM are authenticated by EMV protocol
runs, but some with a zero withdrawal amount.
(a) Rear of card showing real EMV chip (right), monitoring
microcontroller (bottom left), and flash storage (top left)
(b) Card is 0.8mm at thickest point so within tolerance for
use within EMV terminals
Figure 4. Passive monitoring card used to collect UN data
Table I
CATEGORISED UNPREDICTABLE NUMBERS
(a) From Various ATMs
Counters Weak RNGs
ATM4 eb661db4 ATM1 690d4df2
ATM4 2cb6339b ATM1 69053549
ATM4 36a2963b ATM1 660341c7
ATM4 3d19ca14 ATM1 5e0fc8f2
ATM5 F1246E04 ATM2 6f0c2d04
ATM5 F1241354 ATM2 580fc7d6
ATM5 F1244328 ATM2 4906e840
ATM5 F1247348 ATM2 46099187
ATM3 650155D7
ATM3 7C0AF071
ATM3 7B021D0E
ATM3 1107CF7D
(b) From local POS terminal
Stronger RNGs
POS1 013A8CE2
POS1 01FB2C16
POS1 2A26982F
POS1 39EB1E19
POS1 293FBA89
POS1 49868033
might suggest the use of a signed integer.
Based on our analysis of RNGs from logs, ATMs and
POS terminals, we can distinguish three broad classes of
ineffective RNGs: (a) an obviously weak RNG algorithm
(e.g. counters or clocks directly used as the UN, homegrown
algorithms, casting down to the wrong integer size); (b) a
simple RNG with little or no seeding (e.g. linear congru-
ential generator, combinations of fixed bits and bits that
cycle, using standard C library calls such as time() and
rand()); (c) an RNG that can be put into a predictable
state (e.g. a strong RNG fed by a weak source of randomness
that’s restarted on power-up, or an RNG that relies only on
data from previous transactions).
2) Harvesting the data: Given temporary access to an
EMV card, whose holder enters the PIN, and a range of
possible unpredictable numbers to be harvested, the crook
programs his evil terminal to read the static data from the
card and call GENERATE AC to obtain an ARQC and TC
for each possible UN. For each card several dozen ARQCs
can be harvested. The only limitation is the time that the card
can be left in a sabotaged POS while the customer believes
that the machine is waiting for authorisation.
3) Cashing out: In the case of the ATM in Majorca that
started this line of research, the counter rolls over every three
minutes, so an attacker might ask a card in his store for
twenty ARQCs around a point in the 15-bit counter’s cycle.
On visiting the ATM his attack card would first calibrate
to the ATM’s counter, and then initiate transactions when
the counter is expected to be in the range for which he has
captured ARQCs. We show an illustration of the pre-play
attack based on a weak RNG in Figure 5 (left).
4) Implementation and evaluation: We used test cards
with known ARQC-generation keys (UDK) to prove the
attack’s viability using an indistinguishability experiment.
First, we took two test cards A and B loaded with the same
ARQC-generation keys, initialised with the same ATC and
handled identically. Then, we harvested data from card A
and programmed it on to a “pre-play card”, implemented
using the ZeitControl BasicCard platform. Finally, we com-
pared traces between the pre-play card version of card A
and the real card B, and observed that they are identical.
This means that, at a protocol level, it is impossible for an
ATM to distinguish between the real and pre-play cards.
Request ARQC for target UNs
Receive ARQC for target UNs
Receive ARQC for chosen UN
Request ARQC for chosen UN
Perform genuine transaction
(optional)
Perform genuine transaction
(optional)
Replay transaction 
from list
UN’ (from ATM)
Step 1: profile ATM/POS
UN list
(from ATM profiling)
Step 2: harvest
Step 3: cash out
Table of UNs:
ID | UN | ARQC | TX DATA
1  | ----- | --------- | ----
2  | ----- | --------- | ----
….
UN
Step 1: harvest
Step 2: cash out
Replay transaction 
from chosen UN
(ignore UN’)
Replace UN’ for chosen UN
in transaction data from ATM to bank
Pre-play attack via weak RNG Pre-play attack via manipulation of UN 
between ATM and bank
Figure 5. Overview of the pre-play attack using a weak RNG (left) or tampering with the UN at the ATM/POS side (right)
C. Attacks based on UN modification
In real life, we cannot rely on communications between
the merchant and the card issuing bank to be protected
by encryption or even authentication. This is a well-known
problem from ATM networking (see [9, p336]). In such
cases, a man-in-the-middle device between the terminal and
the bank can be used to attack even systems whose random
number generation is sound. In this case, it is no longer
necessary to profile an ATM or POS terminal. The attacker
can simply choose an arbitrary UN and obtain the related
transaction data, including the ARQC, from the victim’s
card. He then replays the transaction data at a terminal
and replaces the terminal’s real UN with his chosen one,
as shown in Figure 5 (right). This could be an attractive
way to attack merchants with high-value transactions, such
as jewelers or investment firms. Even if they guard their
premises and their POS equipment, an attacker can go after
their network link at a utility cabinet.
D. Other attack variants
Even if the UN generation algorithms are patched, or the
communication link between the merchant and the issuer
bank is secured, there are several other protocol attack
variants.
1) Malware infection: There have been numerous cases
of malware-infected ATMs operating in Eastern Europe, and
of POS devices being infected in the USA. Depending on
the internal architecture, it may be easy for such malware to
sabotage the choice of UN. In fact, one bank suggested to
us that the ATM that kicked off this whole research project
may have been infected with malware [10]. Alternatively,
the malware might collude to fix up the UN to match the
presented ARQC.
2) Supply chain attacks: Such attacks have already been
seen against POS terminals in the wild, and used to harvest
magnetic strip data. So it is feasible that a criminal (or even a
state-level adversary) might sabotage the RNG deliberately,
either to act predictably all the time, or to enter a predictable
mode when triggered via a covert channel. A suitably
sabotaged RNG would probably only be detected via reverse
engineering or observation of real-world attacks.
3) Collusive merchant: We have recently seen a trans-
action dispute in which a customer claims to have made
one small purchase at a merchant yet his bank claims he
made ten large ones too. These were filed via three dif-
ferent acquirers, and report different terminal characteristics
despite coming from the same terminal – so the evidence
of fraud is clear. yet the bank maintains the transactions
are the customer’s fault, and the case is proceeding. Banks’
unwillingness to charge back such transactions to merchants
is an open incitement to merchant fraud.
A merchant might maliciously modify their EMV stack
to be vulnerable, or inject replayed card data into the
authorisation/settlement system. He could take a cut from
crooks who come to use cloned cards at their store, or
just pre-play transactions directly. We also have evidence
of merchants tampering with transaction data to represent
transactions as PIN-verified when they were not, so as to
shift liability and cut transaction fees. In the UK, there was
a string of card cloning attacks on petrol stations where a
gang bribed store managers to look the other way when PIN
pads were tampered with and monitoring devices inserted
into network connections – exactly what’s needed for a pre-
play attack.
IV. LIMITATIONS AND DEFENCES
The limits on the effectiveness of the pre-play attack relate
to the data fields included in the MAC, and the quality of
cryptographic checks done by the issuer. When the issuer
follows card scheme standards, the transaction country, date
and amount must be chosen in advance. The PIN of the
card must harvested at the same time as the pre-play data
(or already known). Also, subsequent use of the real card
might advance the application transaction counter or ATC
(a counter kept by the card) and invalidate recorded data.
A. Defences against random-number attacks
The simplest fix for random-number attacks is a cryp-
tographically secure random number generator (RNG), but
this is not necessarily practical. RNG design is a matter
for acquiring banks, ATM vendors, merchants and POS
terminal suppliers, while the cost of fraud falls on card
issuing banks and customers. Issuers might unilaterally
try to detect evidence of harvesting, such as large gaps
in ATC sequences. They should reject online transactions
with out-of-order ATCs, but this is easier said that done,
as transaction re-ordering can occur in offline payments.
We’ve seen banks processing duplicated transactions without
checking the ATC.
B. Defences against protocol attacks
In the short-to-medium term, issuers would do better to
meticulously verify the transaction certificate (TC). This is
sent by the card to the terminal as the transaction completes,
and should be submitted to the issuer when the transaction is
presented for settlement. It states whether the card verified
the ARPC, which in turn was computed by the card-issuing
bank after it verified the ARQC. A pre-play attack can still
yield a TC, but its IAD will show that issuer authentication
did not complete successfully.
But TC checking is rare. Visa’s ‘Transaction Acceptance
Device Guide’ section 5.12 states:
“Devices operating in a single-message or host-
capture environment should ensure a TC is gen-
erated for approved transactions. Although not
needed for clearing, generating a TC ensures that
cards do not request unnecessary online approvals
on subsequent transactions and also provides lia-
bility protection for acquirers.”
Mitigating acquirer liability in the event of stand-in pro-
cessing is all very well, but our concern here is the liability
faced by the cardholder.
In the event of a court having to decide whether a series of
disputed transactions from a single terminal was made with
the cardholder’s collusion or via a pre-play attack, the first
forensic test should be to examine the TC. If a valid TC is
generated by a card following a correct ARPC that in turn
followed a correct ARQC, then the card was present and
active when the ARPC was generated. This does not totally
exclude fraud, as there may have been a relay attack [11];
but pre-play attacks at least appear unlikely.
V. DISCUSSION
The potential vulnerability of EMV to a poor random
number generator was discussed in the abstract by Mur-
doch [12]. Markettos and Moore [7] explored how otherwise
secure true random number generators could be manipulated
to produce more deterministic output, and how to exploit a
weak RNG in an EMV transaction. But this paper is the first
work to show that poor random number generators exist
in the wild, that they have been implicated in fraud, how
they can be exploited, and the protocol flaws in the EMV
specification that make this so hard to counter.
It’s interesting to compare the pre-play attack to full
cloning (where the ARQC generation keys are extracted).
One might imagine full cloning is much more powerful, but
since each card has its own ATC, these will diverge in due
course and become detectable.
In fact, a pre-play attack could be more powerful than a
full cloning attack, for reasons of scale. If keys could be
extracted from cards at no cost, say using a power analysis
attack conducted by a rogue terminal, then a cloning attack
might be done on an industrial scale, but this is unlikely,
as the industry has spent 15 years and millions of dollars
on countermeasures. It is more likely that a cloning attack
would involve card capture followed by destrucive reverse
engineering, and perhaps a semi-invasive attack costing tens
to hundreds of dollars per card.
By contrast, a preplay attack could scale massively. If
a gang succeeds in compromising a number of terminals
(which was done in the UK physically by three separate
gangs in the mid-2000 [13]) or in compromising the commu-
nications to a number of high-value stores (which was done
to jewelry stores in Hatton Garden in the 1980s) the cards
can have ARQCs harvested in one location and presented
in another. The same holds if a number of terminals are
compromised by malware.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
EMV has been around for more than ten years, yet
criminals keep finding serious new attacks. It is shocking
that many ATMs and point-of-sale terminals have seriously
defective random number generators which leave the system
open to fraud. It is even worse that an associated protocol
failures leave it open to fraud at scale using malware in
point-of-sale terminals – a growing real-world problem.
This flaw challenges current thinking about authentication.
Existing models of verification do not easily apply to a
complex multi-stakeholder environment; indeed, EMV was
verified to be secure. We explained why that verification
didn’t work. In addition, mechanisms for rolling out fixes
across networks with huge installed bases of cards and termi-
nals, and strong externalities, are nowhere near serviceable.
We have exposed a structural governance failure that gives
rise to systemic risk. In a multi-party world where not
even the largest card-issuing bank or acquirer or scheme
operator has the power to fix a problem unilaterally, we
cannot continue to rely on a slow and complex negotiation
process between merchants, banks and vendors. Regulators
have been credulous in accepting industry assurances about
operational risk management, and it is time for them to take
an interest. It is welcome that the US Federal Reserve is now
paying attention, and time for European and other regulators
to follow suit.
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